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En el estado actual de las crisis -tarde / noche del 20 julio 2011- el Estado NO puede asegurar la permanencia de España en el euro.
La permanencia de España en la zona euro está en manos de las decisiones que tomen Berlin, París y el Banco Central Europeo (BCE), para intentar salvar la amenazada existencia de la moneda europea.
El Estado español no posee el crédito ni los recursos financieros necesarios para zanjar las dudas de fondo sobre la credibilidad española: España, eslabón débil del euro, Los delirios de grandeza pagados con dinero ajeno son indisociables de nuestra historia castiza.
Dicho de otro modo… España deberá aceptar la disciplina que decidan las grandes potencias de la zona euro, para salvar la moneda común.
¿Qué disciplina pudieran decidir los grandes Estados europeos y el BCE para salvar sus intereses, los intereses de sus bancos y su propia concepción del futuro monetario de la construcción..? España debe ponerse a rezar.
Le Monde y Financial Times han publicado los mejores análisis que conozco, al respecto. Se trata de historias complejas.
En este caso, el precio de la libertad de juicio pasa por el análisis de tales problemas…
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De la contagion généralisée à la solution fédérale : les cinq scénarios possibles.
La confusion règne encore en prélude au sommet extraordinaire des chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement de la zone euro, jeudi 21 juillet à Bruxelles. La chancelière allemande, Angela Merkel, après avoir annoncé qu’elle ne se déplacerait qu’en cas de résultats concrets, a cherché, à l’avant-veille de la rencontre, à en réduire les attentes. Tour d’horizon des scénarios possibles au lendemain de la réunion, en fonction de ses résultats.
Statu quo ou demi-mesures. Rien n’est décidé définitivement, jeudi 21 juillet, mais les travaux se poursuivent dans les semaines qui viennent. La course contre la montre engagée avec les marchés se prolonge dans un climat de grande incertitude. Les négociations avec les créanciers privés traînent, car les banques, compagnies d’assurances et autres fonds continuent de se diviser sur les modalités de leur participation au plan d’aide.
L’enjeu est alors de faire un choix d’ici au versement de la prochaine tranche d’aide, le 15 septembre, en espérant – ce qui n’est pas acquis – que la situation s’apaise dans l’attente de décisions concrètes.
La contagion généralisée. Les Européens n’arrivent pas à se mettre d’accord ni jeudi ni d’ici à la rentrée de septembre. Dans ces conditions, le Fonds monétaire international (FMI), qui a déjà renâclé à cofinancer la cinquième tranche d’aide ce mois-ci, refuse d’être associé à la suivante, le 15 septembre.
Pour éviter une faillite de la Grèce, les pays de la zone euro sont contraints de prendre à leur charge la part du FMI – un tiers des quelque 8 milliards promis pour septembre. Les Bourses continuent de plonger pendant l’été tandis que les conditions de financement des Etats fragilisés battent record sur record à la hausse. Le marché interbancaire, celui des liquidités que les banques se prêtent entre elles, se tend encore, au risque d’isoler les enseignes espagnoles et italiennes de celles du reste du continent, comme c’est déjà le cas pour les instituts financiers grecs ou irlandais. La Banque centrale européenne (BCE) est alors obligée d’intervenir encore plus massivement qu’elle ne le fait aujourd’hui pour assurer la survie des systèmes bancaires en difficulté.
Incapables de rassurer les marchés en dépit de leurs efforts d’austérité, l’Espagne et/ou l’Italie sont contraintes à leur tour à faire appel à l’assistance internationale. Quant aux pays déjà sous perfusion, le Portugal et l’Irlande, ils doivent eux aussi retarder leur retour sur les marchés, au risque de forcer les bailleurs de fonds internationaux à abonder les aides initiales.
L’impact serait énorme sur les banques européennes les plus exposées à ces pays. Ce qui risque, dans le pire des cas, d’inciter les détenteurs de comptes à retirer leurs économies, à mesure que la panique gagnerait les esprits. En principe, les dépôts sont garantis à hauteur de 100 000 euros par déposant et par banque en France, comme dans le reste de l’Europe, en vertu d’une législation adoptée au plus fort de la crise financière. Le plafond de la garantie avait été relevé dans l’urgence pour prévenir une panique bancaire susceptible de mettre à terre les établissements financiers.
L’éclatement de la zone euro. Ce scénario commencerait par une sortie de la Grèce de l’union monétaire. Une telle option appartient cependant au domaine de la fiction. Dans le monde réel, elle est à ce stade exclue par les dirigeants de la zone euro, car elle aurait autant d’inconvénients que d’avantages.
Elle permettrait, certes, à la Grèce de dévaluer sa monnaie nationale, la nouvelle drachme, afin de gagner en compétitivité et de sortir de la récession. Mais elle serait loin de résoudre tous les problèmes du pays. Les épargnants grecs risqueraient, dans cette hypothèse, de se ruer vers les banques pour vider leurs comptes en euros, avant même la renaissance de la drachme. Au risque de ruiner définitivement le secteur bancaire grec. La dette grecque, aujourd’hui libellée en euros, resterait colossale, en raison de la faiblesse de la nouvelle devise.
Cette hypothèse n’est pas non plus la panacée pour les Européens. Un soutien financier serait quoi qu’il arrive nécessaire pour soutenir le pays, qui pourrait être plus lourd encore que celui qui se profile. Le danger serait alors que les marchés s’attaquent à l’un des autres maillons faibles de la zone euro – le Portugal ou l’Irlande -, pour le pousser à suivre le chemin de la Grèce.
Une sortie par le haut. Les chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement se mettent d’accord dès jeudi sur un paquet de mesures. Soit ils optent pour un schéma de participation Zdu secteur privé au plan d’aide à Athènes qui ne représente ni un défaut ni un événement de crédit (par exemple en créant, comme il est envisagé depuis quelques jours, une taxe spéciale sur les banques) ; soit chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement se mettent d’accord sur un défaut partiel, le plus limité possible, et font tout pour réduire les risques de contagion. Cela passe par une réforme en profondeur du Fonds européen de stabilité financière (FESF), le principal instrument de sauvetage mis en place dans l’urgence par les Etats de la zone euro, en mai 2010.
L’idée serait, entre autres, de permettre à cet instrument de racheter de la dette grecque sur le marché secondaire, celui de la revente. Il faut en parallèle convaincre la BCE de continuer à accepter les bons du Trésor grec placés en défaut comme garantie dans ses opérations de refinancement des banques du pays.
Le saut fédéral. Cette option, défendue par le président de l’Eurogroupe, Jean-Claude Juncker, ainsi que par la Grèce ou la Belgique, consisterait, entre autres, à communautariser la dette européenne, par l’intermédiaire d’un outil d’émission d’obligations communes, les eurobonds.
Cette révolution doit cependant s’accompagner, dans l’esprit des sociaux-démocrates allemands qui y sont aussi favorables, d’une restructuration de la dette grecque. Mme Merkel n’est pas favorable à une telle percée, au motif qu’elle nuirait à la discipline commune, en dissuadant les pays les moins vertueux de faire le moindre effort d’austérité et de réforme. L’Allemagne craint aussi de payer davantage qu’actuellement pour financer ses propres besoins, et refuse d’aller vers une union de transferts financiers. [ .. ] [Le Monde, 20 / 21 julio 2011. P.Ri., De la contagion généralisée à la solution fédérale : les cinq scénarios possibles].
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Eurozone: An elusive debt resolution
Peter Spiegel
The quest for a second Greek bail-out is beset by conflict and confusion
As recently as a month ago, it appeared that a second bail-out of Greece would be a relatively straightforward affair. As with previous rescues cobbled together by the European Union and its lending partner, the International Monetary Fund, staff economists would estimate Athens’ financing hole over the next three years (about €115bn), agree a reform programme with the government and start writing cheques.
But instead, European leaders have been drawn into one of the most agonised debates seen since the eurozone debt crisis erupted nearly two years ago. It has sowed confusion in financial markets and pushed borrowing costs for the third- and fourth-largest eurozone economies – Italy and Spain – to 6 per cent, levels some analysts believe are not sustainable.
Greece’s debt burden – expected to hit 172 per cent of gross domestic product next year – is, for example, so large that it may never get paid. Officials cannot acknowledge this, however, for fear of spooking bondholders into believing default is at hand. Similarly, private investors face political pressure to bear the burden of a new bail-out – but among the largest investors in Greek bonds are Greek banks, which would take huge losses (and need more international aid) if their holdings were cut in value.
“Every time we resolve one issue, two more come up,” says a senior European official involved in the deliberations.
The conflicting problems are compounded by conflicting institutions. Almost every participant in the debate – Athens, the European Central Bank, the IMF, the European Commission and national capitals – holds different and sometimes mutually exclusive interests.
The Frankfurt-based ECB, for instance, is responsible for making sure Europe’s banking sector remains solvent. But the sector (as well as the ECB itself) holds vast quantities of peripheral bonds – meaning any undermining of their value could hit their capitalisation levels, limiting their ability to survive a Lehman-like collapse. The German government, on the other hand, under pressure from the Bundestag, wants some of those banks to accept less than they were originally promised for their bond investments.
The result: Frankfurt and Berlin are at – increasingly tetchy – cross purposes. Can the square be circled? Officials say if it was easy to do, it would have been done by now.
There is intense pressure on the Germans and the Dutch to drop their insistence that bondholders pay a price, a stance that has held up an agreement and led to most of the market panic. But Berlin and the Hague argue that without bondholder participation a new deal will not be credible, since it will not lower Greece’s overall debt burden.
Around and around it goes. With just a day to go before an emergency summit in Brussels on Thursday, European officials say they will get a deal done in time. “There needs to be a very clear political agreement on all the elements,” says the European official. However, the battle to determine the exact nature of that deal will go right to the wire.
PROBLEM 1: THE FIRST RESCUE PACKAGE WAS NOT BIG ENOUGH
Solution. European leaders have agreed in principle to a second bail-out, needed to fill an estimated €115bn hole in Greece’s budget during the next three years.
The first package was too optimistic, particularly on Athens’ ability to return to financial markets to raise money for government operations. Under the current plan, agreed in May last year, Athens was supposed to raise €10.9bn in long-term loans from the bond market in March 2012, and €44.1bn between mid-2011 and mid-2013. With Greek 10-year bonds currently trading with interest rates above 18 per cent, officials have been forced to accept that this is impossible. More bail-out money is needed to fill the gap.
Players. Behind the drive for a new bail-out is the International Monetary Fund, whose rules prevent it disbursing aid to a country without ensuring it has all the cash it needs for the next 12 months.
Dominique Strauss-Kahn’s resignation as IMF chief in May complicated matters. Officials say he had indicated he would be more lenient towards the European Union, and would not require it to quickly agree a new bail-out. But John Lipsky, who as IMF interim head had less political room to manoeuvre, pushed hard for a concrete new plan. George Papandreou, Greek prime minister, formally requested another bail-out late last month.
While the eurozone portion of the current bail-out is funded by loans directly from individual countries, the current and new packages are likely to be combined into a single IMF-EU programme totalling as much as €170bn – with the eurozone contribution coming from the European Financial Stability Facility, the €440bn bail-out fund.
PROBLEM 2: GERMAN, DUTCH AND FINNISH VOTERS ARE AGAINST FUNDING ANOTHER BAIL-OUT
Solution. Leaders in all three countries have pushed for private holders of Greek bonds, mostly European banks, to shoulder part of a second bail-out. The original idea, proposed by Germany, was to persuade them to accept a delay in repayment on the €85bn worth of debt due in the next three years.
A more detailed version of this plan, again backed by Germany, would offer bondholders the chance to swap current holdings for new bonds not due for another seven years. Despite the “voluntary” nature of the plan, rating agencies threatened to rule it a “selective default”, as investors would not receive their full returns and officials would probably rely on coercion to win broad participation.
Attention then shifted to a less onerous French-backed alternative, where banks would agree to invest in new Greek bonds as soon as their holdings matured. But rating agencies ruled that this plan would also constitute a default, which sent negotiators for the EU and the banks back to the drawing board.
Players. Pressure for private bondholder participation has been led by Wolfgang Schäuble, German finance minister, and Jan Kees de Jager, his Dutch counterpart. Both governments have promised their parliaments “significant” and “quantifiable” bondholder commitments, despite pressure from bodies such as the European Central Bank to drop the demand.
Leading negotiator for the banks is Charles Dallara, managing director of the Institute of International Finance. In a policy document given to EU leaders last week, he put the French and German plans on a list of possible tacks to which the banks would agree.
PROBLEM 3: GREEK BANKS BEING DRAGGED UNDER BY THE DEBT CRISIS MAY ALSO LOSE EMERGENCY FUNDING
Solution. Highlighting the dual nature of the problem, European officials are working on a two-pronged approach. First, they are trying to tailor the bail-out so that any cut-off of European Central Bank funding would be temporary. They are also discussing plans to inject capital into Greek banks.
The most immediate threat is of a Greek default on its bonds, which would trigger an ECB cut-off. For months Greek banks have relied on the ECB for low-cost loans to run day-to-day operations. But the ECB requires “adequate” collateral – and the banks’ primary form of collateral is Greek bonds, which would be nearly worthless if they were in default. Eurozone officials are looking for ways to conjure up to €20bn in guarantees to enable continued borrowing from the ECB. Alternatively, the ECB may allow the Greek central bank, headed by George Provopoulos, to provide emergency loans.
A default would also probably force international lenders to recapitalise Greek banks as one of their other large sources of capital – Greek debt – would be significantly devalued.
Players. Jean-Claude Trichet, ECB president, has driven this debate with his no-default stand. Others on the ECB’s governing council have been yet more adamant, since there are signs Mr Trichet could relent if even one of the major rating agencies decides against declaring default on whichever plan is adopted.
All Greek banks would probably need a capital injection if there were a bond default but those with particularly large holdings include National Bank of Greece, with a total of €12.9bn; EFG Europank, with €8.7bn; and Piraeus, with €8.1bn.
PROBLEM 4: FEARS OF A GREEK BOND DEFAULT HAVE LED TO A RUN ON SPANISH AND ITALIAN BONDS
Solution. Officials will emphasise that the plan to involve private shareholders in a Greek bail-out is aimed at Athens alone. But it could prove tough to convince investors.
To be fair, some of the panic in Italy is self-inflicted, with prime minister Silvio Berlusconi choosing exactly the wrong moment to pick a public fight with Giulio Tremonti, his respected finance minister. But Spain has been hit hard by “contagion” despite its exemplary implementation of reforms, its spending cuts and the overhaul of its banking system.
The cause of investor concern is the debate over Greece. If European leaders have reached the oint at which they are actively considering defaults and debt restructurings for Greece, what is to stop them doing the same for Ireland and Portugal – which have also been bailed out – or for Italy and Spain? Moody’s, the rating agency, stated when it recently downgraded Irish and Portuguese debt
that the shift in European attitudes towards defaults was a primary motivator in their decision.
Players. Moody’s and the other leading rating agencies, Fitch and Standard & Poor’s, will play a significant role in deciding whether EU efforts to convince markets private bondholder participation is limited to Greece is credible.
Italian and Spanish officials believe they have done as much as they can to reassure investors – including rushing through a €47bn Italian austerity programme in recent days – and are hoping a quick decision on the specifics of a Greek bail-out at the Brussels summit on Thursday will end the assault on their sovereign bonds. Mr Berlusconi’s spat with Mr Tremonti continues to cause concern, however.
PROBLEM 5: ATHENS’ DEBT BURDEN IS TOO BIG TO BE PAID OFF
Solution. The overall Greek debt burden stands at €350bn. The most significant new suggestion for reducing it is to use the European Financial Stability Fund to finance a large bond buy-back plan – a scheme that could also be adopted by Ireland and Portugal. Although the EFSF does not have the power to conduct such a plan, it could lend Greece the funds to make the purchases itself.
Because Greek debt currently trades significantly below face value, investors would take a “voluntary” loss when selling their bonds in a buy-back – but would at least receive something for their investment. In return, Athens would retire the bonds and cut its debt burden. As Greek bonds are now trading at about 60 per cent of face value, a €30bn buy-back programme could wipe €50bn off the balance sheet.
Germany, which has long resisted this plan, looks ready to concede. It also looks more conciliatory on another point: lowering the rates Ireland, Portugal and Greece pay on their EFSF bail-out loans. Originally, all bailed-out countries had to pay 300 basis points above the EFSF’s cost of borrowing, a punitive rate meant to discourage bail-outs.
Players. Mr Trichet has been pushing to use the EFSF for bond buy-backs, and has supporters within the European Commission, especially Olli Rehn, the EU’s most senior economic official. Mr Rehn, backed by José Manuel Barroso, commission president, is also a prime advocate for lower interest rates.
Angela Merkel, German chancellor, and Mark Rutte, Dutch prime minister, would be making a significant climbdown if they backed the bond-buying scheme since they fiercely resisted it six months ago.
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maty says
Por si acaso, recordemos los códigos de los billetes de euro:
Nauscopio Scipiorum Billetes de euro: códigos de identificación nacional (letras por países). Alemania: X, Francia: U… España: V
-> Imagen Billetes de euro: Códigos de identificación nacional
JP Quiñonero says
Maty,
Suponiendo que se tengan billetes por contar, claro,
Q.-