El resultado del plebiscito ya es definitivo:

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Generalitat de Catalunya. Elecciones al Parlament 27-S 2015.

Cataluña: “¡Ganan los otros / los nuestros!” “¿Qué hacer..?”.

¿Hay alguien dispuesto a dialogar y / o negociar algo entre las distintas familias de esos dos bandos antagónicos?

La prensa financiera europea lo ha repetido con insistencia: el inmovilismo cuesta muy caro al bolsillo de los contribuyentes, los ayuntamientos, las comunidades autónomas y el Estado, España / Cataluña, el costo económico del lío.

Constitución, financiación del Estado, modelo político: diez años de reformas pendientes… prolongar ese duelo a garrotazos solo traerá más gastos por pagar, más deudas por acumular y menos riqueza por repartir.

Las crisis políticas pendientes pueden agravarse, cómo dudarlo: Financial Times sobre el duelo a garrotazos Cataluña / España: o negociación, o crisis institucional.

La satisfacción suicida / cainita con la que unos y otros “comentan” los resultados del 27-S parece augurar semanas y meses de incontables chalaneos tabernarios, amenazas, chantajes y estacazos. Paisaje castizo y esperpéntico. Financial Times vuelve a repetir que, por esa vía, no se va a ninguna parte, salvo a un despeñaperros común.

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September 28, 2015 6:46 pm

Catalonia needs to step back from the brink

Sunday’s regional poll does not give it the right to break with Spain

Spanish politics have long been troubled by the demand from Catalonia’s secessionist leaders for their region to become an independent country. After Sunday’s elections to the Catalan parliament, their campaign risks provoking a head-on clash with Madrid. For the first time, the main pro-independence parties formed a single electoral list, pledging to set up a separate state if they were to receive more than half the seats in the Barcelona assembly. They achieved that goal, winning 72 of the 135 that were contested.

Following the result, Artur Mas, the Catalan president and a leader of the independence bloc, declared that he has the “strength and legitimacy” to press ahead with a plan to separate Catalonia from Spain. His strategy foresees the gradual creation of a new state, establishing a Catalan foreign ministry, tax authority and central bank over the next 18 months. This poses a direct challenge to the Madrid authorities, who have resolutely opposed Catalonia’s independence drive. And yet while Mr Mas may be enjoying fresh momentum, he has less legitimacy to implement his plan than he might like to think.

Catalonia’s pro-independence leaders were entitled to use these regional elections to test the appetite of their people for a break with Spain. But the poll in no way constituted a binding referendum. True, the Madrid government has refused to allow Catalans to hold an in-out plebiscite along the lines of the one that the UK government permitted in Scotland last year. Still, the result does not give Mr Mas any legal right to commence his programme for secession.

Aspects of the election result also raise doubts about how strong the popular demand for independence truly is. The secessionist parties collectively won 48 per cent of the votes cast. This means that in the most high-profile consultation on Catalan independence so far, they fell short of winning the overall majority that would be needed in a proper referendum. Nor is the nationalist camp unified and coherent: while Mr Mas’s party has a pro-European agenda, it relies for its majority in the new parliament on a far left movement which wants Catalonia to quit the EU, the eurozone and Nato. These rival visions for an independent Catalan nation will not easily be reconciled.

The Madrid government cannot ignore the strength of secessionist sentiment in the north-east region. It is one of Spain’s wealthiest, accounting for 20 per cent of Spanish GDP. The independence movement is powered by local anger at the extent to which taxes raised in Catalonia are transferred to the country’s poorer areas. This has prompted calls for the Barcelona parliament to be given greater autonomy over taxation and spending.
Some consideration could be given to such demands but there is a limit to how far fiscal devolution can go. Most EU nations — and indeed the eurozone itself — operate on the principle that there is a transfer of funds from richer regions to poorer ones. If every wealthy region in the euro area were to follow the Catalan example and try to keep its wealth for itself, the entire bloc would soon unravel.

Political leaders in Catalonia and Spain have a duty to take steps to avoid what would be a damaging collision over independence. Once Spain has held national elections at the end of this year, a new government in Madrid needs to enter into talks with Mr Mas to find a third way between independence and the status quo. Madrid may have to give some ground. Mr Mas must recognise the risks he poses to both Catalonia and Spain if he unilaterally tries to establish a separate state.

Las negritas son mías.